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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decades, private security has been significantly on the rise worldwide.  In 
order to understand the causes and consequences of this phenomenon, scholars must 
begin mapping out the historical trajectories of private security in national jurisdictions.  
Moreover, detailed international comparisons are needed for grasping similarities and 
differences between countries, with a particular focus on the exact perils and rewards of 
private security arrangements.  This paper argues that state institutions are pivotal in 
facilitating and directing the practice of private policing and security industries.  
Governments cannot shirk their responsibility to regulate contract guards to ensure a 
fair and effective protection of their citizenry.  In pursuit of that end, the authors provide 
some snapshot descriptions of national industries, along with preferred research 
agendas to deepen the understanding of the social, legal and political impacts of private 
security on contemporary societies. 
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‘It has become conventional wisdom that policing is changing in  
all countries and transnationally’ (Marenin, 2005: 101). 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From Europe to the Americas, from Africa to Asia and from Australia back to Europe, 
we observe the same pattern: a mushrooming of contract guards on all continents of the 
world.  In some counties, private security is even outnumbering the workforce of public 
police agencies.  This trend is not particularly surprising, as traditional state-led police 
are relative latecomers in society.  Citizens and agencies other than the police have 
always been involved in order maintenance and peacekeeping (Johnston, 1992; 
Rawlings, 2003).  Most modern constabulary forces are, at best, only 200 years old.  
Moreover, our „modern‟ police bodies that evolved and grew during the nineteenth 
century institutionalization of state power have never eradicated the private (paid and 
unpaid) forms of policing that preceded them (Zedner, 2006a).  What is new, though, is 
the deepening hegemony of commercialized policing over long-standing civil initiatives.  
Some scholars even argue that state dominance over the past two centuries can be 
interpreted as a „historical hiccup‟ (Shearing, 2005: 62) rather than a long-term reality.   
Due to the rise of multiple profit-seeking security providers and auspices, history may 
well wipe out the taken-for-granted idea of stated-based governance that many cherish. 
  
Whether this bold prediction holds ground or not, given the „silent rise‟ of private 
security, it is remarkable that the body of knowledge on the nature and extent of 
industries, although steadily evolving, is still limited.  There is very little cross-national 
knowledge about the security industry worldwide. This lack of comparison is also 
reflected in police studies more generally.  As Jones and Newburn (2006a: 1) write, 
„despite the burgeoning academic interest in policing, there remains a relative dearth of 
comparative research in this field‟.  For Mawby (1990) such a blind spot can be 
explained by the lack of reliable data, intellectual „silliness‟, chauvinism and by practical 
reasons of language, access and expense.  In line with this, Manning (2005: 32) points 
to heavy Anglo-Saxon „ethnocentrism‟, which tends to ignore the influences that local 
histories, policies, economics and cultures have on emerging private security industries 
around the globe.  Empirical insights from non-English language countries are barely 
present in the literature. 
 
Yet, at the same time, there seems to be an increasing awareness of the vital 
contributions cross-national comparisons can make to our understanding of private 
security.  In essence, comparative research is of great importance for grasping the 
similarities and differences between nation-states, and to gain deeper insights into the 
reality of jurisdictions around the world.  First of all, cross-national research can 
contribute to a better understanding of how policing landscapes become the way they 
are, and, second, it can lead to an in-depth analysis of the socio-political impact plural 
(i.e. public and private) policing networks may have (Jones and Newburn, 2006a: 2–4).  
Bayley and Shearing (1996: 588) argue that the augmentation of private security 
companies illustrates a watershed in the evolutions of their systems of crime control and 
Research Article – Van Steden & Sarre 
Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 –  Page 3 
 
law enforcement.  Future generations will look back on our era as a time when one 
system of policing ended and another took its place.  
 
We should be careful, however, before jumping to conclusions about the exact causes 
and consequences of the growth of private security worldwide.  Theoretical (and 
normative) notions should not lose sight of empirical evidence (Jones and Newburn, 
2002, 2006a, b).  Therefore, this chapter addresses the need for better-informed debate 
about the flourishing of private security companies worldwide in order to analyze the 
depth and breadth of an assumed transformation in public order maintenance and social 
control. 
 
The current paper is clustered around four themes.  The first part explores what private 
security is and how it is measured.  This is not an easy task, because, in reality, there is 
no agreed definition of what exactly constitutes „private security‟.  Moreover, official data 
on growth figures are often lacking, and occupations are highly diversified.  Next, the 
paper maps out private security around the world by presenting data collected from the 
various resources available.  Taking into account the methodological problems 
mentioned, we are not presenting an in-depth description here, but rather aim to give a 
brief impression of „how big‟ private security industries are.  The third part of the paper 
asks why private security has become so popular in western and developing countries‟ 
markets alike.  Answers point in various directions, but there is strong evidence that 
government policy is a key factor (Van Steden, 2007).  The fourth and final part 
discusses what we coin the tragic quality of contract guards.1  Private security may have 
„pathological effects‟ (Johnston, 2007: 32) related to professionalism, exclusionary 
conduct and social cohesion, and thus additional research into this area is required.  
 
Defining Private Security  
On an empirical level, private security is difficult to define.  Indeed, Joh (2004) refers to 
it as a „paradoxical‟ concept.  Although the law draws a clear distinction between „public‟ 
and „private‟, both sectors are increasingly difficult to tell apart.  At present, the police 
and private security industries perform many of the same tasks and have many of the 
same sorts of responsibilities.  Private security companies have deeply penetrated their 
businesses into the fabric of policing and justice.  Nevertheless, there are qualitative 
distinctions between public and private „police‟ as they, arguably, have their own 
„toolboxes‟, goals, resources and strategies (Stenning, 2000; Joh, 2005).  Commercial 
companies must sell security, whereas state police forces are generally publicly 
financed and managed (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983; South, 1998; Rigakos, 
2002; Wakefield, 2003).  
 
In addition, and making things more complicated, the private security „industry‟ is not a 
homogenous and steady group, but rather a multitude of evolving sectors, large and 
small, not having much in common other than what unifies them under the banner of a 
fairly deceptive „market of fear‟ (George and Button, 2000; Zedner, 2006b).  For 
                                                             
1 This phrase was originally coined in a presentation given by the first author at a 2007 
policing conference in Dubai. 
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example, the Dutch Ministry of Justice distinguishes between (1) private security 
companies, (2) other companies (such as bars or discos) employing „in-house‟ guards, 
(3) cash-in-transit companies, (4) alarm monitoring stations and (5) private detective 
firms.  Furthermore, there exists a huge security product and equipment sector.  There 
are risk management and consultancy companies, and forensic accountancy services.  
Private security is increasingly everybody‟s business.  However, since manned guarding 
(or staffed) services represent, by far, the largest segment of the industry, we 
specifically focus on this market.  
 
Speaking of manned guarding services, Shearing and Stenning (1981: 196) established 
two criteria: guards are „(a) privately employed and (b) employed in jobs whose principal 
component is some security function‟.  Yet this definition is not watertight, primarily 
because security guards are increasingly employed by (quasi) public auspices including 
municipalities, prisons, neighborhood committees, universities and the like.  Therefore, 
Sarre and Prenzler (2009: 4) recently redefined security guards as: 
 
„those persons who are employed or sponsored by a commercial 
enterprise on a contract or „in-house‟ basis, using public or private funds, 
to engage in tasks (other than vigilante-style action) where the principal 
component is a security or regulatory function.‟ 
 
Specifically, this definition covers staff mandated to control crime, protect property and 
life, and maintain order (Joh, 2004: 55).  Again, though, a kaleidoscope of specialized 
occupations carries out such duties.  Consider, among others, static guards, shop 
guards, airport guards, bouncers (or door supervisors) and event security officers 
whose shared characteristics are numerous.  They all 
 
 do their work for profit; 
 are hired by paying customers; 
 serve individual customer interests; 
 normally wear conspicuous uniforms; 
 sometimes carry firearms or make use of dogs; 
 derive their powers from civil and contract laws. 
(adapted from Van Steden, 2007) 
In the first instance, scholars defined contract guards‟ natural habitat as „mass private 
properties,‟ ranging from shopping malls to airport terminals (Shearing and Stenning, 
1981, 1983), but today wider „communal spaces‟ like neighborhoods, town squares and 
entertainment districts are taken into consideration too (Kempa et al., 2004).  Guarding 
personnel are, in fact, pervasively present in the wider public domain of towns and 
cities. 
 
Measuring Private Security 
 
In measuring and counting private security, we carried out desk research by consulting 
(academic) publications and gathering statistics from census databases and market 
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research.  Trying to sketch the precise contours of private security industries turned out 
to be tricky, because what has mostly been available was fragmented information that 
suffers from various difficulties (Jones and Newburn, 1995; Prenzler, 2005; Van Steden 
and Huberts, 2005).  First, the quality of accessible sources varies considerably from 
country to country.  Second, registration systems do not always differentiate between 
full-time and an apparently sizeable group of part-time personnel, which probably leads 
to an over-estimation of workforces.  On the other hand, however, „in-house‟ staff are 
often not counted, so it could also be argued that we are actually under-estimating the 
size of private security.  Third, because of fierce competition, private firms do not like to 
advertise their earnings and personnel numbers to researchers and, fourth, private 
security companies, especially the transnational ones, are delivering services that go 
beyond what is commonly thought of as private security.  They are, for example, 
involved in ambulance and rescue work, facility management, training programs and 
custodial care that have little to do with general guarding activities.  Industries thus flow 
in multifarious sectors, making counting a precarious undertaking.  Having this said, we 
still think it is worthwhile to present international data on the reach of private security 
worldwide.  The data shown below give the most complete overview delivered so far in 
the academic literature, and can serve as an anchor point for more meticulous 
comparative studies.  
 
International Comparisons  
Despite the fact that any attempt to measure private security must be hedged with 
caveats, there is widespread consensus among observers about the mounting 
pervasiveness of private security personnel in many countries (Jones and Newburn, 
2006b).  The following snapshots from a variety of countries and regions have been 
drawn from a growing list of articles, reports and reviews devoted to the subject of 
privatized provision of security.  Information on legislative authority and regulatory 
conditions is also included in the discussion below, where such information is available 
and of interest.  Aside from Antarctica, we list the six world continents below in random 
order.  The country selection is simply a reflection of the availability of reliable data.  
 
North America 
 
Security industries are so diverse in North America that their data, while not difficult to 
find, are difficult to compare.  Early estimates indicate that 429,000 private staff, 
compared to 694,000 public law enforcement personnel, were employed in the United 
States in 1972 (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977: 18).  According to the Hallcrest report, this 
number had grown to almost 1 million private employees by 1990 (Cunningham et al., 
1990: 196-197).  One and a half decades later, the USA boasts some 60,000 security 
companies, and private industries employ approximately 1.5 to 2 million guards 
(Manning, 2006: 110).  One estimate puts the number of security workers in Canada at 
around 82,000 compared to just over 59,000 police (Law Commission of Canada, 2002: 
9-10).  In both the United States and Canada, responsibility for regulation rests on the 
national and territorial level.  Most states (USA) and provinces (Canada) have minimal 
systems that, compared to many European nations, are relatively weak. 
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Central and South America 
 
In Mexico, approximately 10,000 private security firms operate within the country.  Yet 
fewer than half of these firms have employees who possess an official permit.  In 
December 2000, there were 153,885 registered employees, but their actual number is 
probably significantly higher (Reames, 2005: 1192).  In South America, the data are 
very difficult to find.  Only Brazil provides some information for our purposes.  A case 
study suggests that 1,200 private security companies with a total workforce of 400,000 
were available for hire in 1998 (Wood and Cardia, 2006: 154).  Indeed, the federal 
police contract with private guards to protect persons, property and assets, especially in 
metropolitan areas such as those found in São Paulo.  Since 1983, the Brazilian 
security industry has been covered by specialist legislation.  Additional research sets 
estimates on Mexico and Brazil much higher and also presents figures on other 
countries in Central and Latin America generally (Abelson, 2006). 
 
Africa  
 
Data on Nigeria, Kenya and Sierra-Leone have been gathered recently by Abrahamsen 
and Williams (2005 a, b, c).  In Nigeria, private security is the second largest income 
earner for the nation after oil and gas.  Numbers in the security guard sector may be as 
high as 100,000.  Virtually any business, embassy, non-governmental organization 
(NGO) and residential compound will have contracts with (armed) private security 
personnel.  Given the huge socio-economic inequalities that exist throughout Kenya, 
private security is a major industry, generating as many as 48,800 jobs.  Security 
guards are, regardless of the risks they run, not permitted to carry firearms.  Because of 
a brutal civil war which raged across Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002, security remains 
a top political priority, hastening a rapid expansion of commercial guarding services.  
Although numbers may be much higher, there may be as many as 30 security 
companies operating, employing approximately 3,000 persons. 
 
The security sector in South Africa may be expanding by as much as 30 per cent per 
year.  1999 figures indicate that, apart from 60,000 „in-house‟ personnel, the industry 
employs 350,000 guards.  Even when only counting the number of „in-house‟ and 
„contract‟ security guards, the police/private security ratio is approximately 1:3.1, or it 
could be as high as 1:4 (Minnaar and Ngoveni, 2004: 45).  However, Shearing and Berg 
(2006) are more moderate in their estimates.  They assume the size of registered 
security officers was 250,000 in 2004, representing a doubling since 1997.  Since the 
fall of the apartheid regime, a number of multinational firms have become established in 
South Africa.  These massive corporate players absorbed a large number of local 
security businesses, whose numbers dropped from 5,185 in 2001 to 4,271 in 2003. 
 
Asia 
 
According to Yoshida (1999), the security industry in Japan has grown from 775 
companies employing 41,146 guards in 1972 to 8,669 companies employing 377,140 
(fulltime and part-time) guards in 1996.  The security industry significantly outnumbers 
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the Japanese police force, comprising, on 1996 figures, over 225,000 officers.  Latest 
data from Japan indicate that this has continued to grow since then, with 459,305 
security guards as opposed to approximately 240,000 police officers in 2003 (Yoshida 
and Leishman, 2006).  Government authorities hold powers to sanction security firms 
that violate the rules by the imposition of strict penalties, imprisonment or the 
suspension and even termination of business.  Even in the centralized market economy 
that is China, approximately 250,000 Security Service companies had been, by 1999, 
brought into existence as a free market competitor to the internal security system (Guo, 
1999).  In the Republic of South Korea, the rate of change has been rapid.  From 1978-
2005 the numbers of security personnel rose to well over 115,000 (compared with 
93,271 police officers), a growth rate of 2,320 per cent (Button et al., 2006). 
 
Data concerning private security in the Middle East is scarce.  Countries are mostly 
governed by strict Islamic regimes which exercise strong control over information on 
„sensitive‟ topics such as crime and safety.  Nonetheless, De Jong (2002: 36) has 
conducted explorative research on the situation in Saudi Arabia and reports that four 
large security (guarding) companies employ approximately 3,500 staff throughout the 
country.  They are part of a larger industry covering some 40 companies and 16,000 
staff.  Special legislation dates back to 1992 when the Ministry of the Interior issued 
Rules of Private Civil Security.  Strikingly, this law obliges owners of, for instance, 
banks, jewelry shops and residential compounds to hire commercial guards, boosting 
the industry‟s growth throughout the 1990s.  There is, however, no evidence that the 
industry has expanded since then. 
 
Australia 
 
In 1998-99, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2000) recorded 1,714 businesses 
in security services industries, employing over 31,700 persons (Prenzler, 2005).  This 
list included those firms that identified themselves as such, typically private detectives 
and inquiry agents, but did not include government security agencies, nor locksmith 
services, alarm wholesaling and security equipment installation.  Licensed security 
agents, on figures supplied by State licensing agencies in 2003, numbered 
approximately 140,000, but these figures include individuals who hold multiple licenses.  
One should compare the number (approximately 48,000 on 2003 figures) of sworn 
police officers in Australia.  Census data show that between 1996 and 2001 the 
Australian population increased by 6.0 per cent, police numbers increased by 6.5 per 
cent and security providers by a staggering 31.1 per cent (Prenzler and Sarre, 2006).  
Being a federation, the legal conditions for private security vary across Australia.  
Although all states require security guards to have no criminal records, they differ in 
their legislative requirements concerning training criteria, education levels and other 
competency standards. 
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Table 1.  Security personnel numbers in various regions of the world 
 
Region Security force  Region Security force 
     
South   Eastern 
Europe 
 
 
Africa  
Albania 4,100  Nigeria +100,000 
Bosnia -
Herzegovina 
±2,000 
 
Kenya 48,800 
Croatia ±15,000  Sierra Leone +3,000 
Kosovo 2,580  South Africa +250,000 
Macedonia  3,000    
Moldova +3,000  Pacific  
Montenegro +1,900  Australia +49,400 
Serbia ±30,000    
Russia +850,000  Latin America  
Ukraine 33,000  Colombia 190,000 
  
 Mexico 
150,000–450,000 
Asia   Brazil 400,000–570,000 
Japan 459,305  Venezuela 75,000 
South Korea 115,845  Chile 45,000 
   Argentina 75,000 
Middle East   Peru 50,000 
Saudi Arabia 16,000  Central America 105,000 
  
 Other countries 
70,000 
North America  
  
 
USA +1,500,000    
Canada 82,000    
     
 
 
Europe 
 
Given the absence of firm and comparable data, in 1999 De Waard (1999) published a 
comprehensive international study of private security, covering 27 countries including all 
the countries of the European Union (EU) at the time, plus 12 others.  His study was 
based upon reports from the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs in 1996.  De Waard estimated that 
there were 592,050 security personnel in the EU.  On 1 May 2004, 10 new member 
states successfully joined the existing 15 member states, and then on 1 January 2007 
Bulgaria and Romania were added to the Union bringing the total number to 27.  These 
events had considerable implications for the number of police officers and commercial 
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security personnel previously counted by De Waard.  His estimates were truly in need of 
revision.  An update of European research was provided by Morré (2004) who collected 
figures for the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS), the European 
umbrella association for private security.2  Additional information about Bulgaria and 
Romania are drawn from SEESAC (2005), an institution devoted to establishing peace, 
stability and prosperity in South Eastern and Eastern Europe.3  Taken together, these 
reports reveal that the total number of security personnel has more than doubled 
between 1999 and 2004-05.  There are currently approximately 1,255,841 guards active 
in the Union.  The police employ some 1,609,360 officers, by comparison indicating that 
overall, governments are still the primary players in the field of order maintenance.4  
 
Although the present shifts towards private options in policing are likely to continue 
apace across the EU, there is little reason to think that there will be standardized 
European-level legislation for the private security industry.  The regulation of markets 
varies significantly from country to country; some countries have strong standards while 
others have none at all (Button, 2007).  Therefore, many questions about public 
supervision of private security personnel remain largely unanswered.  Currently the EU 
is aspiring to create a real internal market for private security.  However, demanding 
governments like the Dutch fear that their strict legal controls may be undermined.  The 
Dutch thus oppose every effort to compromise authorization and licensing structures, 
which they believe are crucial for ensuring ethical and professional private security 
industries.  Other critics argue that European standards are too wide and imprecise, as 
they cover a wide diversity of security activities and sectors.  Given a fear of watered-
down Europeanization processes, national industry associations have introduced new 
codes of conduct and quality assurance projects.  It is, however, far from clear if and 
when EU standards will come into effect.    
Table 2: Security personnel numbers in the European Union 
 
 
Country 
 
Total police 
Total 
private 
security 
Police per 
100,000 
inhabitants 
Private 
security per 
100,000 
inhabitants 
Private 
security/ 
police 
ratio 
      
Austria 30,000 6,790 366 83 0.23 
Belgium 39,000 18,320 379 178 0.47 
Bulgaria 28,000 130,000 374 1,724 4.6 
Cyprus 3,000 1,500 386 193 0.50 
Czech 
Republic 
47,400 28,100 465 275 0.59 
                                                             
2 Further details can be found at <http://www.coess.org>. 
3 Further details can be found at <http://www.seesac.org>. 
4 See, for more statistics and information on private security in the European Union, van 
Steden and Sarre (2007) and CoESS / INHES (2008). 
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Denmark 14,000 5,250 259 97 0.38 
Estonia 3,600 4,900 257 350 1.36 
Finland 7,500 6,000 144 115 0.80 
France 145,000 117,000 240 194 0.81 
Germany 250,000 170,000 303 206 0.68 
Greece 49,900 25,000 468 234 0.50 
Hungary 40,000 80,000 400 800 2.00 
Ireland 12,000 20,000 308 513 1.67 
Italy 280,0005 55,000 482 95 0.20 
Latvia 10,600 5,000 461 217 0.47 
Lithuania 20,000 10,000 556 278 0.50 
Luxembourg 1,573 2,200 340 476 1.40 
Malta 1,800 700 455 176 0.39 
Netherlands 49,000 30,000 301 184 0.61 
Poland 103,309 200,000 267 518 1.94 
Portugal 46,000 28,000 439 267 0.61 
Romania 45,830 37,291 207 168 0.81 
Slovakia 21,500 20,840 398 386 0.97 
Slovenia 7,500 4,500 375 225 0.60 
Spain 193,450 89,450 481 215 0.46 
Sweden 18,000 10,000 200 111 0.56 
United 
Kingdom 
141,398 150,000 235 249 1.06 
      
Total 1,609,360 1,255,841 324 253 0.78 
  
 
The growth of private security companies in countries outside the EU, in particular the 
Balkans, is probably a direct result of perceptions of a growing „market of violence‟ in 
the region (Eppler, 2002).  Therefore, in these regions, concerns have been raised 
relating to the (mis)use of weapons, including automatic weapons, by private security 
(SEESAC, 2005).  The same concerns hold for the former Soviet Union, the break-up of 
which contributed to the spectacular growth of the private sector (Favarel-Garrigues and 
Le Huérou, 2004).  The market is, by and large, divided between detective agencies, 
private security services (PSSs) and private protection companies (PPCs).  In 1999, 
statistics indicated that almost 200,000 licensed employees (that is, those who are 
entitled to carry a firearm) were working for security services and protection companies, 
but the total number probably exceeded 850,000 (Volkov, 2002: 137).  Not unlike the 
position in (South) Eastern Europe, regulatory structures for the private security industry 
are weak in Russia. Despite a 1992 federal law on private detective and protective 
activity which gave legal status to the commercial provision of security, business 
                                                             
5 This number is based on De Waard‟s (1999) estimate of the Italian police force 
numbers, because of missing data in the CoESS report. 
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relations are still highly informal.  This informality has had a negative impact on the 
transparency and accountability of the industry. 
 
Transnational Conglomerates 
 
Corresponding to the rapid growth of guarding services around the globe, tendencies 
towards corporate security have bred massive transnational conglomerates.  
Companies such as the Securitas Group, Group 4 Securicor (G4S), Tyco International, 
Secom, The Brink‟s Company, Sohgo Security Services, Chubb, Corrections 
Corporation of America and Prosegur have allowed a „globalization‟ of commercialized 
security provision to develop.  Johnston (2007: 30) has categorized multinational 
businesses as „conventional ones‟ such as guarding services, and „specialized ones 
linked to transnational security‟ such as drug testing and airline protection.  
Subsequently, multinationals are usually involved in financial risk management, fraud 
prevention and custodial services.  To give an illustration, the Dutch division of G4S has 
been granted permission to provide guards to detention centers and asylum-seeker 
centers, which puts the company in a unique business position.  A sub-sector of 
commercial security is penetrating into military operations and warfare.  This industry 
can be divided in „military providers‟ sending out guards and soldiers, „military 
consultant firms‟ offering training and advice, and „military support firms‟ offering back-
up in forms of, for example, logistics and catering (Johnston, 2007: 31).  It is currently 
estimated that there are between 6,000 and 20,000 private security workers 
(mercenaries) employed in Iraq.  Because, obviously, work is extremely dangerous, 
earnings are high.  Contracts valued at hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars to supply 
only a relative small amount of guards seem to be the rule rather than the exception.  
 
Explaining Private Security 
 
In the early days of theorizing private security, commentators tended to interpret the 
growth of the security industry through a socialist, if not Marxist, prism.  Spitzer and 
Scull (1977), for example, saw an enormous extension of social control in capitalist 
societies.  They wrote, „the private policing of today is organized as a corporate 
undertaking; and its major customers are large-scale organizations who invest in 
policing for the same reason they make other investments: to guarantee profits and 
secure an environment for uninterrupted growth‟ (Spitzer and Scull, 1977: 27).  Such a 
radical left-wing view became nuanced somewhat when commentators began to view 
private policing in the light of other driving factors.  This has led to a plethora of 
explanations, which are summarized below.  They go from the general to the particular.  
  
At a broad sociological level, trends in private security are depicted as an outcome of 
„high modernity‟.  Concentrating on the nature of contemporary (notably western) life, 
influential scholars such as Giddens (1990), Beck (1992) and Furedi (2002) have 
highlighted the double-edged impact that all kinds of today‟s advancements display.  On 
the one hand, social institutions and technological developments have created 
opportunities and prosperities that were unthinkable in any pre-modern system.  People 
can nowadays travel around the world, connect with only one mouse click and enjoy a 
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rewarding existence.  But on the other hand, a more somber side of risk and distrust 
emerge as a globalizing world creates uncertainties, uncontrollable hazards and a 
„disembedding‟ of human relationships.  In the context of „liquid‟ associations and 
morals (Bauman, 2000) where extraordinary dynamism and agility find their 
counterparts in ontological feelings of insecurity, people are collectively yearning for 
„safe freedom‟ (Boutellier, 2004: 35).  The vitality of modern lifestyles goes hand in hand 
with an obsessive desire for protection.  This paradoxical situation creates an optimal 
circumstance within which security industries will proliferate.  
  
From a criminological viewpoint, modernity‟s implicit hope that safety and vitality can be 
painlessly combined is regularly connected to our changing attitudes towards crime.  
Not only have crime rates increased sharply over recent decades, fear of crime, and, in 
a wider sense, disorder have magnified into the sphere of the catastrophic.  Garland 
(2000: 359) even portrays Western societies as „high crime cultures‟ where „[f]rom being 
a problem that mostly affected the poor, crime (and particularly vandalism, theft, 
burglary and robbery) increasingly became a daily consideration for anyone who owned 
a care, used the subway, left their house unguarded during the day, or walked the 
streets at night‟.  The visibility of crime and incivilities, along with emotions of 
vulnerability, has spread out to „civilized‟ populations – with serious consequences for 
wrongdoers.  These tendencies are further inflamed by the terrorist acts of (and since) 
September 11, 2001, which have posed new dangers to national security.  The result is 
an omnipresent „search for security‟ (Law Commission of Canada, 2001) that mobilizes 
police officers and private guarding personnel alike to serve and protect the interests of 
societies‟ middle and higher classes. 
  
An economic perspective lays emphasis on increases in income and wealth, which 
logically creates more criminal opportunities to steal or damage property, and broadens 
the consciousness of risks.  Combined with the obsessive desire for harm avoidance 
sketched above, there is a resultant increase in calls for protection, while a rise in 
affluence generally also generates additional income to pay for it (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 
1977; George and Button, 2000).  Clearly, urban surroundings like shopping malls, 
airport terminal and office parks are highly vulnerable to crime, terrorism and disorder: 
their goods and commodities are within easy reach of many, not always kind-hearted, 
visitors.  This automatically brings into play a fourth, geographical, argument.  As 
Shearing and Stenning (1981, 1983) posed a quarter century ago, the ongoing quest for 
contract guards can be situated within the context of spatial changes.  They point to the 
aforementioned mushrooming of (quasi) public spaces that have eroded the „steering‟ 
role of police forces.  Because of the risk of deviant behavior disturbing the ambience of 
„mass private properties‟ like shopping malls and wider communal spaces including 
town squares, leisure zones and posh neighborhoods (often found in „gated 
communities‟), paid security staff are routinely active here – a presence that undermines 
the idea that the „governance of security‟ is (if it ever was) the sole monopoly of 
constitutionally appointed police forces.  Policing and security are being restructured 
along the lines of markets, residential communities and economic classes, a tendency 
which overthrows the „Hobbesian-Weberian framework where the public sphere is the 
sphere of the governors and the private sphere is the sphere of the governed‟ 
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(Shearing, 2006: 31).  Crime control, put differently, has shattered into a complexity of 
auspices and providers. 
  
Shearing and Stenning‟s „mass private poverty thesis‟, long regarded as the key 
explanation for private security growth, has been pervasively criticized by several 
authors (Jones and Newburn, 1999; Van Steden, 2007).6  Despite being convincingly 
argued and holding important truths, there is a more fundamental answer to the 
question „why‟ private security industries have prospered so abundantly.  This answer 
closely relates to „fiscal constraint‟ or „overload‟ theories that stress those public 
constabularies suffer from inadequate resources.  The mammoth burden that societies 
impose on their police systems outstrips realistic capacities (even if public funding on 
law enforcement has increased substantially), resulting in transference of order 
maintenance duties from the public to the private sector.  Governments are actively 
contracting out „peripheral‟ functions or simply leave responsibilities to the market.  
Thus, the main point here is that, in western countries, government policy perhaps 
explains best what is currently happening to policing (Van Steden, 2007).  Following Joh 
(2004: 68),  
 
„[p]rivate police today find themselves the beneficiaries in the debate over 
the responsibility and capability of government to control crime.‟ 
  
Although other factors surely play a role, political dynamics towards „responsibilization‟ 
and, in a more narrow sense, „privatization‟ (Garland, 1996) are fundamental 
explanations.  Only sovereign states and their national parliaments can decide whether 
private security companies are permitted and licensed to carry out their responsibilities 
and, if so, how far their mandates should reach.  Politicians, public officials and civil 
servants, far from remaining aloof from commercialization trends and increasing 
freedoms to move people, goods, information, money and services around the globe, 
continue to be central players in setting binding guidelines, monitoring upcoming self-
regulating schemes and weeding out malpractice.  However, in developing nations, the 
situation is arguably quite different as states are less capable of channeling and 
regulating private security growth. 
 
Consequences of Private Security 
 
Given the extraordinary and global growth of private security described above, its 
„quality of life impact‟ (Prenzler, 2004: 283) is still remarkably under researched.  
Scholars, but also politicians and policy-makers, take the presence of contract guards 
for granted as „minor‟ players in the policing landscape.  Governments, in general, have 
facilitated and even stimulated the unobtrusive appearance of contract guards, but have 
                                                             
6 Underlying this thesis, Shearing and colleagues claim that the presence of private 
auspices (i.e., businesses, communities and individuals) have shifted power relations 
between the state, market and civil society.  The state is now one „node‟ (albeit an 
important one) in a „polycentric‟ or „networked‟ world (Bayley and Shearing, 2001; 
Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007). 
Research Article – Van Steden & Sarre 
Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 –  Page 14 
 
responded quite sluggishly to the need for regulation (Brodeur and Shearing, 2005: 
394–395), implying an attitude of indifference and neglect.  This is a mistake.  Private 
security industries have developed into firm social institutions, which, like families, 
governments and churches, represent and carry out well-organized practices and 
normative functions in the world today.  
This development, according to some, is more a tragedy than a comedy (e.g., Loader, 
1997a; Manning, 1999).  Private security, as a social institution, embodies „the character 
of a civil war in miniature – it depicts a society engaged in a struggle with itself.  And 
though this may sometimes be necessary, it is never anything other than a necessary 
evil.‟7  The tragic quality of contract guards, in short, is that everybody needs private 
security, but nobody really wants it.  No matter how well entrepreneurs are organized 
and how well they try to distance themselves from unsavory „cowboy companies‟, their 
private security industries are bound to be beset with enduring tensions and difficulties.  
 
First, contract guards are widely perceived as a „grudge purchase‟ – a perception that 
hampers good payment, worthwhile salaries, innovative developments and first-class 
services.  Although training schemes have sometimes been professionalized, 
requirements and standards vary greatly from country to country.  Therefore, various 
academic observers voice criticism about the social, physical and ethical skills of private 
security guards (e.g., Zedner, 2006b).  Guards must not be confused with police 
officers, even though they are granted ever more tasks and responsibilities.  So how 
effective are they in providing security?  Do security guards really provide second-rate 
services as has often been assumed? 
 
Second, the implications of private guards‟ client-centered mandates are commonly 
presumed to contravene civil liberties, to focus upon poor communities and compromise 
human rights.  As touched upon earlier, private operatives seem to primarily serve 
individual interests, not those of society as a whole.  Does this mean we drift towards 
ever more closed malls and communities, as already found in the USA, South Africa 
and Latin America?  And how does this influence the lives of the excluded and 
marginalized?  States that are „weak‟ or „failing‟ – „where the capability of the state to 
perform its essential functions has largely disappeared‟ and „basic state institutions, if 
they still exist, are largely dysfunctional‟ (Dupont et al., 2003: 332) – seem particularly 
vulnerable to private security invasion.  Will their police forces deteriorate? 
 
Finally, and most urgently, what is the effect of privatized security services on the 
„symbolic‟ and „binding‟ power of policing functions?  In Loader‟s (1997b: 8) formulation: 
„the idea of policing […] brings to mind (and stomach) sensations of order, authority and 
protection; it makes it possible for people to believe that a powerful force for good 
stands between them and an anarchic world, that the state is willing to defend its 
                                                             
7 This phrase is borrowed from Garland (1990: 292).  He analyzed punishment as a 
social institution.  However, it can be argued that private security industries are part and 
parcel of the punishment institution.  Their rise can be seen as a logical extension of risk 
management aimed at controlling economic losses by punishing (perceivably) deviant 
and dangerous groups through exclusion (Young, 1999). 
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citizens.‟  Are contract guards also capable of being such a powerful force?  Are they 
able to generate the aura of reassurance that surrounds the public police?  Scholars 
doubt and even fear that private security will eventually weaken policing as a „thick‟ 
communal good – a prerequisite for upholding the „irreducibly social‟ and „deeply 
implicated‟ relationships with our fellow citizens (Loader and Walker, 2001: 26). 
 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
 
In an attempt to answer the foregoing questions, observers should continue to turn their 
gaze to several research agendas (Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Sarre, 2005).  
Researchers should, first of all, map out „similarities and differences within and between 
different jurisdictions‟ and „gain a better understanding of social reality in different 
national contexts‟ (Jones and Newburn, 2006a: 2).  Only through these exercises can 
patterns and trends be observed and analyzed.  Some significant research work has 
been undertaken to critique appropriate and effective models of cooperation between, 
specifically, public and private personnel.  This research reveals that, while public and 
private managers alike have lauded close cooperation, the rhetoric often fails to match 
the reality (Johnston, 1996; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Sarre and Prenzler, 2000; 
Wakefield, 2003; Van Steden, 2007).   
 
Nevertheless, there is still much to be done.  Researchers should put more efforts in 
determining what the precise rewards and perils of various private security 
arrangements are.  Although contract guards are obviously vested with an exclusionary 
mandate towards anything that contravenes the interests of their paying clientele 
(potentially to the detriment of the common good), governments also develop and adapt 
to new arrangements and regulations that match the changing realities of policing.  For 
example, a Dutch phenomenon is the introduction of privately delivered, but publicly 
employed (sworn-in) „special constables‟ (Buitengewoon Opsporingsambtenaren) 
working for regulatory and investigatory agencies.  Although these officials originally 
have a private status, they become embedded in the public system, ensuring effective 
checks and balances. 
 
However, in practice, privatization processes have most commonly not taken this form, 
meaning that constitutional protections are frequently absent and are unlikely to be 
politically supported whether sooner or later.  Such a political reluctance is not entirely 
accidental, because, as Sklansky (2006: 104–105) shrewdly notes: 
 
[t]he central idea of private policing is to bring the disciplined mindset of 
business to the problems of order maintenance and crime control – and 
perhaps also, in the bargain, to relieve the government of some costly 
obligations.  At some point, bringing public values to private policing is like 
redesigning the Hummer to make it lighter and more fuel-efficient: you can 
do it, but if what you really care about is gas mileage, you may be better 
off with a different prototype. 
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Therefore, research should continue to gather empirical evidence about principles, 
interests, mentalities and accountability models in order to better determine the 
challenges private security industries pose to „law and justice‟ criteria.  The future of 
policing and security governance, in an environment where the needs of order 
maintenance change on a regular basis, demands no less. 
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